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THE WILL OF THE (IRAQI) PEOPLE
Haider Ala Hamoudi'
I. INTRODUCTION
While there has been much scholarly and popular media literature on the Iraqi
Constitution, attention to contemporary Iraqi judicial decisions, and in particular
those of the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court (Court), has been far less pronounced. In
fact, my own search has led me to only a single published law review article on the
subject, at least since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime.' There is some irony to
this-it is, after all, rather difficult to address the concept of constitutionalism in
any state without reference to constitutional praxis, and the judiciary is, at the very
least, an integral participant in that praxis.
This Article addresses this omission with a review of Iraqi judicial practice
over the past half decade. The Article argues that Iraq's judiciary is generally
(though not entirely) independent of overweening executive influence, and its
rulings are generally (though not entirely) heeded by the political classes and the
broader polity. As such, most centrally, this Article maintains that the judiciary's
emerging practice does not differ from contemporary scholarly accounts of the
history of the United States Supreme Court. Or, better stated, the differences are of
degree rather than quality. This Article does not suggest that a nation unable to
form a government until more than eight full months after elections were held
precisely for that purpose is particularly stable.2 Nor should one be excessively
sanguine about Iraq's future simply because of its largely effective judiciary.
© 2011 Haider Ala Hamoudi, Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh
School of Law. This paper was presented at the Conference on Judicial Independence in
Times of Crisis, held at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. I would like
to thank the S.J. Quinney College of Law, along with the conference co-sponsors, the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the University of Cambridge Centre for Public Law,
as well as the participants at the conference for their helpful comments and suggestions.
Special thanks go to Professor Chibli Mallat, Professor Wayne McCormack and Dean
Hiram Chodosh for their kind support and assistance in the preparation of my talk, and this
Article. Any errors are my own.
I am grateful to Marc Silverman, Director of Public Services at the Barco Law
Library University of Pittsburgh School of Law for helping ascertain this. The one
exception is a well-written and scintillating piece by two individuals who served as legal
advisers in the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. See Charles B. Trumbull IV and Julie B. Martin,
*

Elections and Government Formation in Iraq: An Analysis of the Judiciary's Role, 44

VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 331 (2011). Unfortunately, the very recent date of publication of
the article made it impossible for me to reference it extensively herein. Suffice it to say that
Trumbull and Martin share my sanguine view of the Iraq judiciary, and in fact hold an even
more optimistic view as concerns the de-Ba'athification crisis discussed in Part II of this
Article. See Trumbull and Martin, supra at 360-61.
2 John Leland & Jack Healy, After Months, Iraqi Lawmakers Approve a Government,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2010, at A6.
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Nevertheless, the story of the Iraqi judiciary is largely a reassuring one to date, and
any suggestions to the contrary arise either out of a failure to appreciate the extent
to which Iraq's judiciary is both independent and respected, or perhaps more
commonly, out of a failure to understand the nature of the judicial task in any
nation, be it emerging or developed, Iraq or the United States.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part II addresses the independence of the
Iraqi judiciary from direct executive interference, and provides limitations on the
thesis that the judiciary is able to work largely without threat of reprisal from the
executive. Part III deals with the legitimacy of the judiciary's decision making and
the broad (though by no means unlimited) extent to which its rulings are heeded by
other political institutions and the broader public. Part IV acknowledges that the
Iraqi courts, particularly at the higher level, perceive themselves as constrained
enough to proceed cautiously and carefully. They are therefore anxious to issue
rulings that will not be broadly rejected by the political classes, and they do not
desire to enter into divisive disputes that could lead to a loss of the judiciary's
prestige. Part IV goes on to argue that, far from being some sort of anomalous
example of judicial failing, the Iraqi judiciary is, in so doing, conducting itself
precisely as any judiciary would, including that of the U.S. Supreme Court-at
least according to contemporary scholarly accounts, particularly that of Barry
Friedman's The Will of the People.3
II. IRAQI JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Most media accounts tend to dismiss the possibility of Iraqi judicial

independence rather breezily, and often unfairly.4 A typical example is reflected in
the New York Times, where reporter Rod Nordland addresses a decision of the Iraqi
Federal Supreme Court concerning formation of the government under Article 76
of the Iraqi Constitution.' Nordland suggests that the decision was unexpected,
unexplained, swift, and therefore could have been influenced by pressure from the
sitting executive power (in particular the current prime minister, Nouri AlMaliki).6 Nordland goes so far as to dismiss the Court as merely "nominally
independent." 7
3 See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 14 (2009) (indicating that over
time, "Supreme Court decisions tend to converge with the considered judgment of the
American people").
4 With respect to media accounts, see, for example, Rod Nordland, Maliki, Trailing in

Iraq Vote, Is Contesting the Result, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at A4. Moreover, I have
worked with countless numbers of international development experts in Iraq who, off the

record, say much the same respecting the lack of independence of Iraq's judiciary and its
alleged capture by political interests.
5

Id.

6 Id.

("[A] day before the results were announced, [Maliki] quietly persuaded the
Iraqi supreme court to issue a ruling that potentially allows him to choose the new
government.
7

id.
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The legal issue in the decision in question involved the meaning of the phrase
in Article 76, translated loosely as "the faction with the highest number of
representatives." 8 The matter is significant because the leader of that faction is to
be the prime minister designate.9 As is typical in parliamentary systems, the
president of the republic charges the prime minister designate to form the
government.10 The government is formed when an absolute majority of the
parliament, known as the Council of Representatives," votes in favor of the
proposed government.12 If the prime minister designate fails in the task, then the
leader of the second faction is asked, and the process repeats itself.'3
The legal issue presented is that in the recent election, the Iraqiya, an electoral
coalition comprised largely of Sunni parties, managed to win the highest number
of seats in the Council of Representatives.14 The Iraqiya won two more seats than
the second-place finisher, the predominately Shi'i Coalition for the State of Law,
led by Nuri Al-Maliki.' 5 Maliki was subsequently able to obtain significant support
within the third-place coalition, the Iraq National Alliance, which is also

Article 76, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005. All translations of the Iraq Constitution referred to in this Article
8

are my own. For an alternative translation, see U.N. ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR IRAQ, IRAQI
CONSTITUTION, at Article 76, Section 1 (2006) [hereinafter UN's ENGLISH TRANSLATION],
available at http://www.uniraq.org/documents/iraqi constitution.pdf.
9 Article 76, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the

Republic of Iraq] of 2005; see also UN's ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supra note 8, at Article

76, Section 1.
'o Article 76, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005; see also UN's ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supra note 8, at Article

76, Section 1.
" Article 48, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq]
of 2005; see also UN's ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supra note 8, at Article 48. Technically,

under Article 48, the legislature is composed of two houses, a Council of Representatives
and a Federation Council. However, under Article 65, the formation of the Federation
Council requires the passage of a law by the Council of Representatives by a two-third vote
of its members. Article 65, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic
of Iraq] of 2005; see also UN'S ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supra note 8, at Article 65. No

such law has ever been enacted. The result is, for the time being, a de facto unicameral
legislature.
12 Article 76, Section 4, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005; see also UN'S ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supra note 8, at Article

76, Section 4.
13 Article 76, Section 3, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005; see also UN's ENGLISH

TRANSLATION,

supra note 8, at Article

76, Section 3.
14

Hannah Fairfield & Archie Tse, The 2010 Iraqi ParliamentaryElections, N.Y.

TIMES (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/03/1 1/world/middleeast/
-iraq-election.html.
20100311
5
1

id
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predominantly Shi'i.16 Maliki claimed that the term "representative faction" is
broad and means any sort of faction that might be formed after elections among the
representatives in the Council of Representatives at the time.17 Conversely, leaders
of the Iraqiya coalition claimed that "representative faction" is a narrow term and
refers to the electoral coalition that received the highest number of seats in the
Council of Representatives.' 8 In the end, as Nordland correctly reports, the Iraqi
Federal Supreme Court adopted Maliki's interpretation, to the continuing dismay
of the Iraqiya.19
The first part of Nordland's claim, that it was "widely assumed" 20 that the
term in question would mean that the winner of the elections would be given the
first opportunity to form a government, is false. In fact, when negotiations were
taking place over potential amendments to this clause, there was a deep debate
over precisely this clause, both as to what it meant and whether it should be
redrafted so that it would be clearer. 2 ' The irony was that it was the Sunni parties at
the time (most prominently, the group known as Tawafuq, the largest Sunni
coalition in the Council of Representatives before the 2010 elections) who were
arguing in favor of the broader interpretation of the clause, because they were
certain that they would never be part of a winning electoral coalition and would
require post election alliances to have even a chance at leading the government.
Maliki's representatives, Ali Allaq and Abbas Bayati, were resisting the broader
interpretation-presumably because they seemed certain that they would never
lose an election.22 Given the divide, no resolution was reached on the matter, and it
Id.; see also Raheem Salman, Sadr Camp Backs Malikifor Top Post, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 2, 2010, at A3 (describing support of Iraq National Alliance leader Moqtada al-Sadr
for Maliki).
17 Nordland, supra.note
4.
16

20

id

21 1 served

as a legal consultant to the Constitutional Review Committee and observed
negotiations regarding amendments to Article 76. Every meeting of the several dozen held

by the Constitutional Review Committee between August of 2009 and January of 2010 was
attended by either me, Professor Chibli Mallat, or in some cases, both of us. These
meetings were held in the offices of the Chair of the Constitutional Review Committee,
Sheikh Humam Hamoudi. The consultation was part of a larger project organized and run
by the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law entitled: "Global Justice Project
Iraq." The project was funded by the U.S. Embassy's Constitutional and Legislative Affairs
Office and operated in Baghdad from the fall of 2008 through March of 2010. It provided
support on a variety of legislative and regulatory initiatives in areas ranging from criminal
procedure, electoral laws, and commercial legislation, to, of course, constitutional
amendments. The project was directed from Salt Lake City with the invaluable support and
guidance Dean Hiram Chodosh and Professor Chibli Mallat of the University of Utah S.J.
Quinney College of Law. The project was managed on the Embassy's side by the
indefatigable and enormously dedicated April Powell-Willingham until her replacement by

the able Patricia Wildermuth and her effective deputy, Barbara Mulvaney.
22 See discussion supra
note 21.
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remained a point of bitter and longstanding contention. 2 3 Ironically, the two sides
switched into the. diametrically opposite positions before the Court, when it
became clear that the result none of the negotiators had thought possible actually
occurred-a victory by a largely Sunni electoral coalition.
. In addition, the broader interpretation can be defended on strong legal
grounds. The language in the original Arabic is patently ambiguous; 2 4 either
construction is plausible. Global precedent, however, favors Maliki. For instance,
in the Israeli elections of February of 2009, as in Iraq, two electoral coalition ended
up in a very close race, with Tzipi Livni's Kadima coalition prevailing with a
slight edge over Benjamin Netanyahu's Likud coalition.25 Precisely because
Netanyahu was able to gather a larger coalition among the smaller parties that had
stood for election, President Shimon Peres charged Netanyahu, and not Livni, with
-26
government formation.
There are reasons for this approach. In any parliamentary system, the putative
government is formed by the prime minister designate and presented to the
parliament for its approval. If it is clear that a leading party is unable to marshal
support among smaller parties sufficient to receive parliamentary approval, the
entire exercise would be a waste of time and resources. The president would, for
obvious reasons, prefer not to request formation of a government by a leader whom
he knew would never be able to secure parliamentary approval because this would
result in a pointless charade. This is not to say that countervailing reasons-for
example, clarity of designation and avoidance of any accusation of impartiality on
the part of the president-do not exist, or that a decision in Iraqiya's favor would
have been unsustainable. Rather, it only suggests that the Court's decision as
issued was perfectly defensible.
Moreover, while it is true that the Court's decision was brief and not
thoroughly reasoned, as Nordland reports,2 7 this is an equally valid criticism of
French judicial decisions from which Iraq draws much of its jurisprudence.28
Certainly, there are few nations in the world, particularly beyond the common-law
world, whose judiciaries routinely issue opinions, concurrences, and dissents with
the length, detail, and complexity of judges in the United States. There are, of
course, justifications for both practices. Brevity provides clarity of result, while
extensive exposition provides the reader with an opportunity to better understand a
judge's reasoning in reaching a particular conclusion. The broader point is that a
short and cryptic opinion is not grounds for criticism in the broader global context.
23

See discussion supra note 21.

Article 76, Section 1, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005.
25 Isabel Kershner, FormingCoalition, Netanyahu Agrees to Make NationalistLeader
ForeignMinister, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2009, at A6.
24

26

id.

27

Nordland, supra note 4.

28

See, e.g., Mitchel De S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, The European Pasteurizationof French

Law, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 995, 1027 (1995) (describing "the French appellate tradition" as
involving "typically cryptic, formulaic, and syllogistic decisions").
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Thus, in the end, the opinion is defensible in terms of its result, even if a
contrary opinion could have been equally defended. The point is not that the Iraqi
judiciary in this case reached a "correct" result or that it was entirely uninfluenced
by external political forces. The judges on the Court were aware that various
political forces had interests in the outcome. That the judges would,
subconsciously if not otherwise, take such interests into account, particularly in a
case where the language being interpreted is so ambiguous, is obvious,
uncontroversial, and no less true of the American judiciary.2 9 The key point,
however, is that this is not an example of a court being held entirely captive to the
interests of an executive and willing only to execute his commands. This is
particularly true in light of the fact that there are other opinions issued by the Court
that demonstrate a willingness, albeit a cautious and careful one, to take positions
contrary to the interests of the government. 30
Maliki not only sought an alternative interpretation of Article 76, but he also
sought to challenge the electoral results, claiming that his faction ended up with the
highest number of seats.' Under Article 93 of the Constitution, the Court is
responsible for confirming electoral results.32 Rather than rule with Maliki, the
Court confirmed the results submitted months earlier by the Iraqi High Electoral
Commission (IHEC) that were in the Iraqiya's favor. The confirmed results
officially gave the Iraqiya coalition the narrow victory over Maliki's coalitionMaliki's demand for a nationwide recount notwithstanding. 3 4 In some ways, this
ruling worked against Maliki's interests more than the earlier Article 76 ruling
worked to his advantage. That is, a captive court, attentive only to then Prime
Minister Maliki, would have ruled in favor of Maliki on electoral results, granting
him a narrow victory, and then for a narrow interpretation of Article 76, thereby
requiring that he be made the prime minister designate. As it is, the Court rulings
favor Maliki in one case and favor the coalition challenging him in the other.
Moreover, the rulings offer neither a firm resolution on government formation nor
a politicalresolution of the same.
Thus, rather than being captive to a sitting executive, it appears as if the
judiciary is attempting to balance agendas of competing political forces so as to
induce them to decide the matter. That is, the judiciary is using its institutional
capital sparingly and deliberately in not deciding the issue, thereby avoiding
See infra Part IV (describing the Iraq Federal Supreme Court's awareness that
political forces have interests in the outcome of its decisions in greater detail).
30 Iraq Federal
Supreme Court, decision No. 58 of 2009, available at
29

http://www.iraqja.iq/.
31 Nordland, supra note
4.
32 Article 93, Section 7, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq
[The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005; Nordland, supra note 4; see also UN's ENGLISH TRANSLATION,
supra note 8, at Article 93, Section 7.
3 Timothy Williams & Zaid Thaker, Iraq's PremierEndorses a Recount
of the Vote,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2010, at A4.
34 Anthony Shadid, Iraqi Court Ratifies Election Results, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at
A7.
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deeper political determinations that it may feel would be institutionally
inappropriate or that could potentially jeopardize its legitimacy among popular
electoral parties in Iraq.
It might also be mentioned that if one decision is to favor the Iraqiya
coalition, it would be easier to make that the matter of the electoral results. The
results were not only confirmed by IHEC, 3 5 but also were a matter of significant
interest to the United States and the United Nations, which both went to
considerable expense in ensuring that the elections would be viewed as credible
and fair. 36 Thus, although Maliki may have been the executive in control, powerful
political forces specifically worked against his opposition to the electoral results.
Undoubtedly, Iraqi Federal Supreme Court Chief Justice Medhat Mahmoud
could provide ample legal justification for each of the two rulings. In fact, he likely
would react indignantly to any suggestion that he did anything other than apply the
relevant law, or to use Chief Justice Roberts' now famous metaphor, call balls and
strikes as to the legal issues thrown at his Court.37 Legal realists would-for good
reason and with compelling force-react skeptically and maintain that policy
implications and political interests lie behind each decision made by the Court.
Because judges are aware of. such interests in reaching their decisions, the realist
would maintain that the notion of their "neutrally" applying the law irrespective of
those implications and interests, not to mention their own value judgments, is
nothing short of preposterous. Again, I say nothing of the Iraqi example that would
not be equally true in the United States.
To be clear, the unwillingness of the Court to use its institutional capital
widely does not mean it never decides matters against stronger political interests.
The Court has in fact done this. For example, the Court ruled that the Provincial
Council of Salahuddin could remove a provincial governor, who was publically
defended by and deemed an ally of Maliki, because the removal was in accordance
with applicable law.39 The decision and reasoning of the Court could be amply
defended on a doctrinal basis.40 It could also be said, as a legal realist, that the
dispute related not to Maliki's core interests, but rather to a more tangential one,
which included protecting political allies in provinces where he enjoyed scant
support.4 1 The Court thus avoids thorny political disputes, which preserves its

35

36

Nordland, supra note 4.

Marc Santora, FrustrationGrows in Iraq at Slow Pace of Vote Tally, N.Y. TIMES,

Mar. 15, 2010, at A8.
37 See Geoffrey R. Stone, Our Fill-in-the-Blank Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2010, at A27.
31

39

See id.

Iraq Federal Supreme Court, decision No. 58 of 2009, available at

http://www.iraqja.iq/.
40 id.
41 Early Results in Historic Iraq Election Show Brewing Battle between
PM Secular
Challenger, GUELPH MERCURY, Mar. 11, 2010, at 6 (describing Maliki's scant electoral
support in Salahuddin province).
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institutional capital so that it can use it in cases (such as the removal of a provincial
governor) where its rulings are likely to generate less controversy.
More often, however, the Court avoids questions where powerful political
forces are aligned against it, mostly by deciding that such matters lie beyond its
jurisdiction. The Court has done this for a landmark piece of legislation which is
intended to delineate the respective authorities of the provincial and national
governments in those areas of the country not part of the highly autonomous
Kurdish region, the Law of Provinces That Are Not Incorporated in a Region (the
"Law of Provinces"). 4 2 To avoid addressing the application of this controversial
piece of legislation, the Court has adopted a narrow reading of Article 93 of the
Constitution, which grants the Court jurisdiction over issued laws as to (1) facial
constitutionality 43 and (2) the resolution of matters arising out of the applicationof
the law.44 The Court has held that this means that it may not interpret the law
(except as to constitutional defect) unless there has been some action taken by an
authority purporting to apply the law.45
Even the lack of action is insufficient for the Court. Thus, the refusal of a
federal body, the Shura Council, to respond to a Provincial Council in a manner
that the Provincial Council insists is a violation of the Law of Provinces, does not
give the Court jurisdiction because there has not yet been an "application" of the
law.46 This is ironic because when the Shura Council refused to respond to an
inquiry from the Provincial Council of Kerbala, claiming it was under no
obligation to do so, 47 the Provincial Council sought relief from the Court, which
determined that it had no jurisdiction pursuant to Article 93 because of the Shura
Council's refusal to act.48 In other words, there is no forum to which the Provincial
Council can turn to seek a decision on the legality of the Shura Council's lack of
action. The Court will not hear the matter until the Shura Council makes a
decision, and the Shura Council's very position is that it is not obligated to do so.
Therefore, the matter stays in semi-permanent and unsatisfactory stasis.
42

Law of Provinces That Are Not Incorporated in a Region No. 21 of 2008 (Iraq).

43 Article 93, Section 2, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the

Republic of Iraq] of 2005; see also UN's ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supra note 8, at Article
93, Section 2.
4 Article 93, Section 3, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005; see also UN'S ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supra note 8, at Article
93, Section 3.
45 Each of the following cases were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds
that the question did not involve the applicationof law, only the interpretation of a statute

prior to its being applied: Iraq Federal Supreme Court, decision No. 5 of 2009; Iraq Federal
Supreme Court, decision No. 20, of 2009; Iraq Federal Supreme Court, decision No. 24 of
2009; Iraq Federal Supreme Court, decision No. 35 of 2009. All of these decisions are
available at: http://www.iraqja.iq/.
46 Iraq Federal
Supreme Court, decision No. 73 of 2009, available at
http://www.iraqja.iq/.
47

id

48

id
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This narrow reading of Article 93 extends in other directions as well. For
example, the Court exempts unpublished regulations from review because they
cannot be deemed to be "issued by the federal authority" unless published in the
Iraqi Official Gazette.4 9
On one occasion, however, the broader judicial desire to avoid entering into
highly charged political matters failed. The matter related to the disturbing
phenomenon, initiated originally by the United States, known as "deBa'athification."'o Pursuant to this policy, government ministries and institutions
were to be purged of.Ba'ath influence by removing high ranking members from
their positions in the government.5 ' This issue had periodically risen and fallen in
importance and emotional resonance over the seven years that preceded the March
2010 elections. However, the matter arose with some force just before the elections
when the commission responsible for de-Ba'athification disqualified five hundred
2
candidates standing for elections because of their alleged ties to the Ba'ath.s
The matter reached the judiciary, which perhaps in as great a demonstration of
the respect afforded the judicial branch as could be imagined, had been empowered
to exercise review of such highly charged and divisive matters since the enactment
53
of the compromise legislation known as the Accountability and Justice Law. The
law required appeals to decisions respecting de-Ba'athification to be brought to a
specialized panel of the Court of Cassation, the highest court of general
widely
jurisdiction. 5 4 The actual decision is published, and the results were
5 The initial
outlets.
media
global
discussed among Iraqi politicians and among
decision, defensible on the merits, was a careful balance between the forces
favoring de-Ba'athification and those opposed to it. The special Cassation panel
56
did not reverse the ban, but only deferred the matter until after the elections. The
judicial panel reasoned that it could not review the evidence for so many putative
candidates so close to an election. As a result, the more sensible course was to let
49 Iraq Federal Supreme Court, decision No. 36 of 2010, available at
http://www.iraqja.iq/.
50 See ANDREw ARATO, CONSTITUTION MAKING UNDER OCCUPATION: THE POLITICS

OF IMPOSED REvOLUTION IN IRAQ 45-48 (2009) (describing devastating results of early
American efforts at de-Ba'athification).
s Id.
52 Steven Lee Myers, Iraq Court Overturns Bans on Candidates,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
2010, at A12.
53

See Accountability and Justice Law No. 10 of 2008, art. 15-17 (Iraq) (affording

judicial review of de-Ba'athification matters).

Id. The jurisdiction of the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court is anything but general, and
has been construed by the Court itself to be quite narrow. See supra notes 41-48 and
54

accompanying text.
55 Myers, supra note 52; Judicial Panel Overturns Election Ban: Will Review
'Democratic Credentials' of Candidates after the Election: Update, Global Just. Project
Iraq (Feb. 3, 2010), http://gjpi.org/2010/02/03/appeal-panel-overtums-election-ban-andpostpones-de-baathification-examination/ (citing Court of Cassation decision No. 108 of

Feb. 3, 2010).
56

id.

54
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all of the candidates stand for office, rather than provoke an immediate crisis by
enforcing the ban prior to the election, because a vast majority seemed destined to
lose at the polls. 57
The problem was that the issue of de-Ba'athification was dissimilar to issues
like the removal of a provincial governor, or even the interpretation of
constitutional text respecting government formation, where the Court's approach
proved more acceptable (at least to some). Rather, it was an issue that deeply
divided Iraq's respective communities. It was one of the reasons that Sunnis voted
overwhelmingly against the Constitution when it was submitted for referendum.58
To the Sunnis, de-Ba'athification was a witch hunt, an attempt to tar their entire
community with the excesses and outrages of the previous regime and to keep
them marginalized. 5 9 To the Kurds, and even more so the Shi'a political elite, the
process was not only salutary but vitally necessary to ensure Iraq's survival as a
democracy.60 In addition, there was probably a punitive element designed to
deprive perceived participants in the former regime of coveted government
positions with their guaranteed pensions and comfortable pay.
Given the emotional intensity of the issue, the careful balance the court
attempted could not work. The Shi'i parties engaged in what can only be termed
old-fashioned McCarthy-era demagoguery and were able to urge thousands of
Shi'a to march in demonstrations against the Ba'ath.62 At the same time, countless
Shi'i politicians, appealing to the same base and concerned about the politically
devastating consequences that could attach if they were declared soft on
Ba'athism, attempted to outdo one another on anti-Ba'athist credentials.63 Maliki
himself threatened to ignore the Court because it had made what he viewed as an
unconstitutional ruling. 4 After a meeting between Chief Justice Medhat and
As Shadid reports, there were 6,500 candidates running, and 500 had been removed
on the grounds that they belonged to the Ba'ath party. Anthony Shadid, Iraqi Commission
Bars Nearly 500 Candidates,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15 2010, at A4. There were only 325 seats
5

available in the Council of Representatives. See Fairfield & Tse, supra note 14. Assuming
that the accused Ba'athist candidates were equally as likely as the general pool to be

elected, this would result in 25 seats going to the more than 500 candidates excluded had
they been permitted to run.
ALI A. ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: WINNING THE WAR, LOSING THE PEACE
415-417 (2007).
" Id. at 152.
6o Id. at 150-51.
61 Id.
62 Steven Lee Myers, Iraq Court Given Time
to Review Candidates,N.Y. TIMES, Feb.

8, 2010,
63 at A10.
id.
6 Id. Conventional wisdom has suggested that Maliki ordered the Ba'ath purge and
organized the demonstrations to remove political rivals standing in the election against

him. See, e.g., Kenneth M. Pollack & Michael E. O'Hanlon, Iraq's Ban on Democracy,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at A21. That explanation is not convincing. There were
thousands of candidates running, and voters could choose among any number of affiliated
candidates on an electoral list. Support for Maliki was not particularly strong in Sunni areas
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parliamentary leaders, the Court ultimately backed down, determining that it could
review all of the evidence. It then summarily decided the political fates of
thousands of candidates in a period of days through a process as opaque and
inscrutable as can be imagined. 6 6 At the end of the ordeal, only twenty-six
candidates were restored to the ballot.67
To these Kafkaesque theatrics, dispiriting in their obvious deprivations of
anything approaching fair or sensible legal process, I offer no defense other than
this. Highly charged political issues, whether they be slavery in 1860s America,
presidential elections in modem America, or Ba'athism in post-Saddam Iraq, are
not where judicial participation is ever witnessed at its noblest, its most fruitful, or
its most productive levels. To its credit, the specialized panel of the Court of
Cassation initially appeared to realize this, but its attempt to deflect responsibility,
or at least delay it, proved a gross miscalculation for which it paid a steep price in
terms of legitimacy.
III. IRAQI JUDICIAL AUTHORITY

Disturbing reflections on de-Ba'athification aside, in Iraq, there appears to be
at work a functioning and independent judiciary that is not simply a mouthpiece
for the executive branch. Yet, independence is one thing; authority is quite another.
A court that is only free to make rulings that are of no practical effect, because the
executive will not enforce them, is hardly a salutary result.
It can, however, fairly be said that Iraqi court decisions have been heeded by
political authorities, even when those decisions have run against the political
interests of the executive branch that is responsible for their enforcement. The Iraqi
Federal Supreme Court's affirmance of the Salahuddin Provincial Council's
dismissal of the provincial governor, which was discussed previously, is a telling
example.6 8 The provincial governor himself had initially appealed the matter,
insisting that he had a right to remain in power.69 Maliki originally sided with the
where individuals alleged to be affiliated with the Ba'ath Party would likely be located.
Accordingly, Maliki's interest in winning seats in those areas was not great. Moreover,
Maliki could not have hoped to endear himself to that constituency by banning their
favored candidate. Voters' most likely reaction to the ban would not be to vote for Maliki,
but rather someone else on the same electoral list as the banned candidate. The more likely
scenario is the one I have outlined, that the rhetoric and demagoguery surrounding
Ba'athism was an attempt to gather more Shi'i votes, not remove potential Sunni
competition.
65 Myers, supra note 62.
6

See Steven Lee Myers, Candidatesto Stay Off Ballot in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,

2010, at Al9.
67

id

Iraq Federal Supreme Court, decision No. 58 of 2009, available at
http://www.iraqja.iq/.
68
69

Steven Lee Myers & Anthony Shadid, Leader Faulted on Using Army in Iraqi

Politics,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2010, at Al.
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provincial governor and refused to recognize the dismissal. 70 However, once the
Court intervened to affirm the removal, Maliki conceded and ordered that the
governor be removed.n In fact, Maliki ordered that the Province Office for the
Governor be placed under military occupation to prevent the Provincial Council
from seating another governor without his input.7 2 Maliki's involvement with the
governor's removal and replacement was sordid and crossed well over any
reasonable line of legality with the important exception of Maliki acceding when
the Court ordered the removal of the existing governor; even though the governor
was an ally of Maliki. The episode is hardly an unambiguous omen for the
resumption of the rule of law, because of the military interventions, but it does
demonstrate an encouraging and noteworthy respect for the rulings of the Court.
Far more significant than this single example is the fact that few politicians of
note have challenged the Court as being invalidly constituted, despite having
ample grounds to do so. The current Iraqi Federal Supreme Court was created
pursuant to an interim constitution known as the Transitional Administrative Law,
enacted in 2004,n and Law No. 4 of 2005, a law enacted by an interim
legislature.74 Importantly, however, Articles 92 and 93 of the current Constitution,
approved after the Court was created, clearly contemplate a different court, one
comprised of Islamic law jurists with a different jurisdictional grant than that given
under the law that created the current Court.7 5 In addition, Article 92 indicates that
a law defining the composition and scope of work for the Iraqi Federal Supreme
Court must be passed by a supermajority of two-thirds of the Council of
Representatives.7 6 There is no legislative consensus on the composition of the
Court;n as a result, such a law has never been passed, meaning that the current
Court, created with a different jurisdictional grant and under a different
Constitution, continues its existence in a caretaker role by implicit and unspoken
consensus. It assumes the functions of the Court despite not being, as a formal
legal matter, the institution designated to perform the task.
It is noteworthy that the Court has rarely been described as illegitimate on this
basis (with one exception to be discussed shortly), though it could be. In contrast,
such an accusation has been made forcefully and repeatedly against the
Accountability and Justice Commission-responsible for de-Ba'athification-just

id
id.
72 id
70
71

ALLAWI, supra note 58, at 224.
Iraq Federal Supreme Court Law No. 30 of 2005 (Iraq).
7s See id.; Articles 92-93, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of
the
Republic of Iraq] of 2005; see also UN's ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supra note 8, at Article
92-93.
76 Article 92, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of
the Republic of Iraq]
of 2005; see also UN'S ENGLISH TRANSLATION, supranote 8, at Article 92.
n See discussion supra note 21 (describing my extensive work with the Council of
Representatives, during which no consensus was observed).
7
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after its dismissals of the 511 candidates prior to the 2010 elections. Like the
Court, the Commission was effectively reconstituted by passage of a subsequent
law-in this case, the Accountability and Justice Law. 79 That law called for the
Council of Representatives to approve new members of the Commission, 80 which
never occurred because of political deadlock.8 ' Thus, the existing Commission
carried over in a caretaker role. The formal, legal similarities are remarkable-both
institutions were created through a set of laws and were expected to be replaced by
other institutions due to the passage of subsequent legislation. However, because
further legislative action is necessary for new institutions to be fully constituted,
the existing institutions assume the role of their successors on a temporary,
caretaker basis.
Yet, in the case of the Accountability and Justice Commission, those opposing
its rulings made it very clear that, in their view, the entire Commission is invalid
pending new membership. 82 It is an indication of the Court's considerably greater
legitimacy that this argument has not often been raised with respect to the Iraqi
Federal Supreme Court. It seems as if the Court's efforts to preserve its
institutional capital and avoid engaging in thorny political questions have yielded
some fruit.
' While the Court's decisions are heeded almost invariably, there are some
limitations on the broad legitimacy afforded to the Court. In particular, the Iraqiya
have never come to accept the Court's ruling that the term "representative faction,"
in Article 76, is broad and refers to any faction that might be formed after
elections. This opposition has taken any number of manifestations. Most benign
is the indication by Vice President Hashimi, an Allawi ally, that the Constitution
must be amended to correct the error of the Court.84 This is a formal legal
maneuver, and even if it does cast doubt on the Court's legal analysis, it does not
in any way threaten its legitimacy or its independence, because a people may
amend their own Constitution.
More disturbing were suggestions by Hashimi, in a separate appeal to the
Court, in which he asked the Court the basis for its jurisdiction given its caretaker
status, thereby gently questioning, without openly confronting, the Court on this
78

Anthony Shadid, How an Inflammatory Term, Baathist, Bars Candidates in Iraq,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2010, at A6 (describing the Commission as being "on shaky legal
ground"); see also Shadid, supra note 57.
7 Supreme National Commission of Accountability and Justice Law No. 10 of 2008,
art. 2,80§ I (Iraq).
Id. art. 2, § 4.
81 Shadid, supra note 78; Shadid, supra note 57.

See Anthony Shadid & Nada Bakri, Anger and DisillusionRise as Iraq's Election
Nears, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 16, 2010, at 1; Shadid, supra note 78.
83 See, e.g., Iraq and the World News Summary (Radio Sawa broadcast July 18,
82

2010), available at http://www.radiosawa.com (discussing a July 17, 2010, press
conference where Vice President Hashimi suggested a constitutional amendment to correct
the Court's "error").
8 Id
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question of its legitimacy given the constitutional changes since its creation. 85 The
Court offered an explanation, referring to the necessity of legal continuity, pointing
out cleverly that the salaries of the Presidential Council were paid on the same
basis, and leaving the matter at that.86 The question of the institution's legitimacy
has not been raised again, though the threat of course always remains.
Even more bizarre has been the insistence of another reasonably prominent
Iraqiya leader, Mohammad Allawi (not closely related to the Iraqiya leader Ayad
Allawi), that the Court's interpretation of the Constitution has no weight because
the constitutional founders, and not the Court, are best able to describe its original
meaning.8 7 Mohammad Allawi's position is that, as the founders are alive and well,
they should be consulted to the derogation of the Court.88 Leaving aside the
institutional absurdities implicit in such a suggestion,89 the fact that these founders
are the very Shi'a and Kurds who originally imposed the Constitution on the Sunni
minority that constitutes his coalition's political base appears to be neglected. 90
Thus, consultation with- the constitutional founders would almost certainly not
result in a ruling favorable to the Iraqiya. Finally, and most troublingly, for months
Iraqiya leader Ayad Allawi refused to acknowledge the Court's decision-instead
he repeated the Article 76 claim over and over with a repetition that grew
tiresome.9 1
Again, there is no defense for blatantly ignoring a judicial mandate, other than
to say that this is an exception that appears to prove a broader rule respecting
compliance with court determinations, and one that is not atypical in comparative
context. Courts wading into highly charged political disputes are rarely regarded as
legitimately reaching wisely considered conclusions when ruling in favor of one
side, as the reaction among Democrats to the U.S. Supreme Court decision Bush v.
Gore can attest.92
IV. IRAQI JUDICIAL CAUTION AND THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL ENTERPRISE

While there are considerable numbers of people within the international
development community who might accept the preceding analysis of the Iraqi
judiciary, they would not regard this as an ideal state of affairs. The concern is that
the judiciary in general, and the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court in particular, does not
8
Iraq Federal
http://www.iraqja.iq/.

Supreme Court, decision
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For example, does one reconvene the Constitution's drafting
committee and take
their vote each time a constitutional question arises?
90 See ARATO, supra note 50, at 232-33.
9 See, e.g., Nordland, supra note 4.
92 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 334 (describing the
reaction of the left to Bush v. Gore
as "extraordinary"); see Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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act boldly enough to assert particular positions of interest. Rather, the judiciary
constantly and carefully assesses its decisions and the likely reaction, of political
forces before proceeding. The criticism of Chief Justice Medhat, which I have
heard informally with some regularity, is that he is a "survivor." These critics
within the international development community assert that "survivors" are not the
source of forceful, independent institutions that protect human freedoms and
demarcate government institutional boundaries, as courts should do.
On the one hand, there can be no doubt that the decisions of the Iraqi Federal
Supreme Court can be understood to be exercises in "survival," which is different
93
from saying that the decisions are indefensible as a formal legal matter. As we
have seen, the Court reads its jurisdiction narrowly when it decides disputes on the
94
issue of federalism between provinces and the central government. It also has
decided cases in favor of the existing government in cases regarding government
formation, and for the government's opponents when evaluating election results
where the opponents enjoy the support of the United States and the United
Nations. This has allowed the Court to avoid making determinations as to
government formation. When it does assert jurisdiction against the sitting
executive, its decisions rarely cut to the core political interests of the executive.
Rather, they cover matters with which the executive can comply without
threatening core interests. The Court's ordered removal of the provincial governor
of Salahuddin is a prime example of this.96 This is not a Court, in other words,
which is likely to attempt to reach conclusions on the core legal and political issues
that divide the country, whether they be federalism, the relationship between Islam
and the state, or (perhaps especially) de-Ba'athification.
Yet, one wonders if the description of Chief Justice Medhat as a "survivor" is
necessarily as pejorative, or as unusual, as might be intended. Such criticisms of
implicit cowardice assume that the Iraqi Court is quite different from the U.S.
Supreme Court, yet the two courts actually seem to consider political reality in a
similar fashion. At least this is true as the U.S Supreme Court is depicted in Barry
Friedman's comprehensive account.97 Friedman argues that the U.S. Supreme
Court has continually adapted its positions specifically to conform to broader
99
popular expectations,9 in a manner similar to the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court.
9 The matter of de-Ba'athification remains the obvious exception where the
reasoning and timing of the decision and its reversal could scarcely be defended. See supra
notes 50-67 and accompanying text.
94 See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
95 See supra notes 4-41 and accompanying text.
96 See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
9 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 14-16 (describing U.S. Supreme Court decisions as
hewing "rather closely to the mainstream of popular judgment about the meaning of the
Constitution").

9' See id.

99 This Article does not claim equivalence between Friedman's sweeping and
comprehensive account of two hundred years of United States' history and these modest
notes concerning five years of Iraqi jurisprudence. Rather, it uses this opportunity to point
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Friedman provides a sweeping and fascinating history of the U.S. Supreme
Court throughout its country's history by dividing it into four distinct epochs. 00
Friedman determines ultimately that the U.S. Supreme Court enjoys prestige
whenever its decisions conform to the broader popular will, and that it loses such
prestige and has its independence threatened whenever its decisions depart
considerably from the mainstream.10 For example, during the 1930s, the U.S.
Supreme Court was unpopular because it struck down New Deal legislation that
had enjoyed considerable public support;10 2 the most well-known case being
Lochner v. New York, where the Court struck down a New York law that limited
bakers to working no more than sixty hours a week. 0 3 In reaction, Roosevelt
unveiled his court-packing plan, which involved appointing more justices to the
U.S. Supreme Court in order to garner the necessary support for New Deal
legislation.104 Roosevelt's own constituencies ultimately opposed the courtpacking plan, though only after the U.S. Supreme Court reconsidered and reversed
its line of precedents striking down New Deal legislation. 0 5
Similarly, Congress stripped the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction on three
separate occasions following the Civil War. 06 This was partly in reaction to Dred
Scott v. Sanford, which had already made the architects of Reconstruction
somewhat suspicious of the Court's loyalties. 07 The case of Ex Parte Milligan, at
the dawn of Reconstruction, also played a key role in the congressional decision to
strip the U.S. Supreme Court of jurisdiction over Reconstruction. 08 While it is true
that the current U.S. Supreme Court enjoys a prestige and respect unparalleled in
the nation's history, according to Friedman, this respect is conditional on its
continuing to fashion decisions in a manner that conforms to popular will.'09
out interesting areas of convergence between the two systems. One important difference
may well be that this Article focuses on the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court's careful
balancing to avoid disturbing existing political interests and forces, where Friedman
focuses on the relationship between the Supreme Court and the popular will. Id. at 14-16.
In response to Friedman characterization of the matter, some have suggested that Friedman
may be creating the notion of the American "people" as a concept from thin air. See, e.g.,
William E. Forbath, The Will of the People?: Pollsters, Elites and Other Difficulties, 78

L. REv. 1191, 1193-94 (2010). This debate is far beyond the scope of this
paper. However, as concerns the Iraqi example, particularly given current circumstances, it
is easier to gauge the Court's conduct as against other (popular) political and government
institutional forces than against the Iraqi people independent of those popular and
representative forces, whether or not a "people" can be so reified.
100 FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 12-14.
'ot Id. at 12-15.
GEO. WASH.

102 Id. at 5.

Id. at 174-76; see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
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Should it depart radically, the judicial institution would then come under renewed
assault.1o

Given this enlightening scholarship, one wonders whether the Iraqi Federal
Supreme Court has performed badly in comparative context. It is true that the Iraqi
Court has not attempted to enter into highly divisive political debates in which the
Iraqi people,. and their elected representatives, are bitterly divided. Yet given the
record of the U.S. Supreme Court when it has done so (from Dred Scott, to Ex
ParteMilligan, to Lochner), perhaps the Iraqi Court is adopting the right course of
action, something similar to what Friedman suggests the current U.S. Supreme
Court does.
Naturally, the Iraqi Court cannot claim the same level of prestige as the U.S.
Supreme Court at this time given its relatively recent appearance and the entire
lack of judicial review during the totalitarian rule of Saddam Hussein."' However,
the point is that the Iraqi Court's prestige appears to be growing, as the Salahuddin
provincial governor example demonstrates. The Iraqi Court's slow and cautious
jurisprudence might have something to do with this, for the same reason that the
U.S. Supreme Court enjoys unprecedented prestige, precisely because it is careful
to adhere to current expectations and not exceed them unduly.
The question we must ask, therefore, is not whether Chief Justice Medhat and
his colleagues on the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court are "survivors." The question,
instead, is whether we should truly be lamenting this fact, or instead extolling it.
There seems much that can be said in defense of such "survivors."
V. CONCLUSION

The Article has argued that the Iraqi judiciary is both independent and
respected. The judiciary, particularly the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court, is largely
free from direct executive influence and its rulings tend to be heeded by political
institutions and the broader public. However, Iraqi courts have proceeded
cautiously in issuing rulings so that they will not be broadly rejected by the
political classes, thus avoiding divisive disputes that could lead to a loss of the
judiciary's prestige. In doing this, the Iraqi judiciary is conducting itself similarly
to courts in other countries, specifically the United States Supreme Court. Thus,
viewed in comparative perspective, the story of the Iraqi judiciary is largely a
reassuring one to date.

no Id.

"' Interestingly, and perhaps indicative of the extent to which the independence of
Iraq's judiciary has been undervalued even prior to the American invasion, there was at
least one attempt during the Saddam Hussein era to declare a law unconstitutional. A Look
at the New Iraqi Leaders, BALT. SUN, July 16, 2003, at 2A. Dara Noor Al-Din, then judge
and current justice minister, was asked to reconsider a constitutional decision and refused.
Id. As a result, he spent two years in prison for the offense, eight months of which were in
the notorious Abu Ghraib prison. Id.

